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ABSTRACT 
 
Foreign aid in Papua New Guinea (PNG) has been heavily criticised on the grounds 
that it has undermined incentives for domestic revenue collection, encouraged 
irresponsible expenditure behaviour and high levels of public debt, and contributed to 
the poor composition of government spending towards wasteful expenditure items.  
This paper seeks to determine what impact foreign grants have had on the fiscal 
behaviour of the PNG Government with the use of a dynamic Vector Error Correction 
Model which estimates a simultaneous system of fiscal equations between 1974 and 
2008. Results show that foreign grants have indeed lowered domestic revenue 
collection but they have also been an important source of debt reduction. In some 
circumstances aid has improved the composition of government expenditure but the 
revenue and debt repayment effects mean that it has had a weak effect on increasing 
overall expenditure levels. Preliminary results also suggest that these effects vary 
considerably according to how aid is delivered, comparing budget support vis-à-vis 
project and program aid delivery. A number of policy implications follow. 
 
1. Introduction 
For much of the post independence era PNG fiscal policy has been categorised by 
persistent deficit financing and growing public debt. Excessive levels of Government 
spending have added to economic volatility and led to three economic crises, each 
requiring donor financed bail out packages to prevent the economy from bankruptcy. 
Declining per capita expenditure levels in key service delivery sectors have also meant 
that since independence resources for items such as health, education and infrastructure 
have been falling (Batten 2009). 
Numerous authors have argued that foreign aid has contributed rather than alleviated 
these adverse fiscal policy settings. Windybank and Manning (2003:12) concluded that 
sustained financial assistance from Australia encouraged successive governments in PNG 
to “live beyond their means, encouraging irresponsible policies and postponing the need 
for reform”. Hughes (2003:25) argues that foreign aid allowed the PNG government to 
continue funding unproductive consumption activities whilst ignoring important social 
investments. This is also believed by many to have contributed to a bloated public sector 
which soaks up scare financial resources (Tulip 2005:1).   
 
Switching from untied budget support to earmarking aid funds to the delivery of specific 
activities through project and program aid has been a key method used by Australia to try 
and improve the development impact of its assistance to PNG. As Feeny (2003:91) notes 
“[t]he Australian policy of phasing out aid provided as budget support in favour of 
project aid has ensured that aid is now used for important projects in the health and 
education sectors.” 
 
Despite these changing aid modalities sectoral expenditure outcomes in PNG have not 
improved and have in many cases worsened. These views were expressed by AusAID 
(2003:27) which highlighted that “…analysis of the PNG Government’s own funding for 
different sectors confirms that government funding for key sectors such as infrastructure, 
health and education was higher when PNG was receiving budget support than in more 
recent times.” 
 
This paper seeks to analyse these relationship with the use of a Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) which allows aid and fiscal aggregates to interact in a dynamic manner 
both contemporaneously and with a number of lags.  Empirical studies on the impact of 
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aid on PNG fiscal performance have been hampered by a chronic lack of consistent data 
on PNG fiscal outcomes. As such this paper also conducts an extensive data collection 
exercise, drawing on a data set from 1974 – 2008. This covers the entire post 
independence period and gives sufficient degrees of freedom to conduct a dynamic 
analysis of PNG’s fiscal behaviour following inflows of foreign aid.  
 
This paper will focus in particular on testing a number of hypotheses regarding the 
impact of aid on fiscal aggregates. These include i) whether grant aid has tended to lower 
the PNG Governments domestic revenue raising efforts, ii) whether grant aid has 
encouraged the PNG Government to be less fiscally responsible and accumulate higher 
levels of foreign debt, iii) whether grant aid has encouraged a deterioration in the 
composition of government expenditures away from key service delivery sectors, and 
finally, iv) whether budget support vis-à-vis project and program aid have had differential 
effects on any of the above. To do this three separate empirical models are outlined and 
estimated below.  
 
This analysis reveals a number of important insights regarding the interplay between 
foreign aid and public sector fiscal behaviour in post independence PNG. Key findings 
include evidence that grant aid has been an important source of debt reduction during 
this period. Grant aid has however tended to erode the domestic tax base which has 
limited its ability to increase aggregate expenditure levels. Preliminary evidence is also 
found which suggests a significant portion of budget support was actually spent on key 
development sectors, although it did also undermine domestic revenue collection. A 
number of policy implications of these findings are discussed in the final section.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Impact of Aid on Fiscal Aggregates – Fiscal Response Models 
Traditionally the impact of foreign aid on fiscal aggregates has been analysed with the use 
of Fiscal Response Models (FRMs). This approach is based on a utility-maximizing 
government which sets itself targets for a variety of expenditure, revenue and borrowing 
outcomes. The government is assumed to maximize its utility by obtaining each one of 
these fiscal targets during each period. An inflow of aid is then assessed on the basis of 
its affect on each of the expenditure, revenue and borrowing targets subject to budget 
and expenditure composition restraints.  
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 Heller (1975) was one of the first to use this approach, analyzing a cross-section of 11 
African countries between 1961 and 1971. The author finds that between 30 and 60 per 
cent of aid was used for additional government spending whilst the remaining funds were 
used to reduce the level of domestic tax and borrowing. On the expenditure composition 
side, the author also found that “aid causes a strong shift away from public consumption 
and toward investment” (Heller 1975:442).  
 
Heller (1975) spurred a range of other papers on this topic which made some important 
methodological improvements to the literature. Binh and McGillivray (1993) for example 
illustrated that the linear-quadratic loss functions which were used for government utility 
in earlier studies were incorrectly specified in the sense that achieving each of the 
expenditure targets did not lead to an unconstrained maximum for their utility functions. 
The authors then developed a quadratic loss function which allows for equal losses in 
utility from both over and under achieving each of the target variables whilst leading to a 
maximum solution following the obtainment of all of the respective target variables1,2. 
Subsequent authors made a number of additional extensions to the literature by 
specifying more realistic budget constraints and incorporating aid into the theoretical 
model as an endogenous rather than exogenous parameter (Franco-Rodriguez, 
McGillivray and Morrissey, 1998; McGillivray and Ahmed, 1999). Mavrotas (2002) 
analysed the various impacts of disaggregated types of aid3, whilst Feeny (2006) 
developed an asymmetric utility specification which allows for larger losses in utility from 
revenue under-shooting than over-shooting4.   
 
Feeny (2007) provides the most recent study to date on the impact of aid on fiscal 
performance in Pacific Island countries, focusing on Melanesia (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
                                                 
1 This utility function for government expenditure is thus generally written as:  
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Where E represents government expenditures, D public debt, T taxation revenue, A foreign aid, B is borrowing and each of the 
starred variables represent their respective target values. The government budget constraint which states that total domestic 
government expenditures (investment and consumption) plus debt servicing costs must equal total domestic revenue generation plus 
foreign aid receipts and borrowing from all other sources. These models are then solved to reveal both the structural and reduced 
form parameters of the model and estimated with a systems equation approach, generally non-linear three stage least squares. 
2 These authors do note however that a potentially restrictive characteristic of this utility specification is its symmetric nature. This 
implies that overshooting and undershooting impose the same loss in utility, which may not be realistic.  
3 The focus by Mavrotas (2002) on disaggregated aid, estimating data for India and Kenya over the period 1973-1990 and 1973-1992, 
respectively, led the author to conclude that for both countries project aid has been less likely to displace other sources of government 
funding as compared to untied forms of aid, such as general budget support. 
4 Feeny (2006) argues that in practice discussions with relevant policy makers almost always indicate a clear preference for 
overshooting, as opposed to under-shooting. As such, he develops an asymmetric utility function incorporating these preferences. 
Whilst more appealing from a theoretical perspective, this approach is however shown to give comparable empirical results as the 
symmetric utility function.  
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Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu) for the period 1989–2002. Here the author finds that 
whilst aid flows have impacted positively on development vis-à-vis recurrent 
expenditures, they have also led to a significant reduction in domestic revenue collection. 
Highlighting that this has the potential to exacerbate problems of long-term aid 
dependency, Feeny (2007:448) then argues that donors should place more effort towards 
strengthening revenue management in addition to their traditional focus on public 
expenditure. 
2.2 Impact of Aid on Fiscal Aggregates – Dynamic Approaches 
The FRM literature has however increasingly been shown to suffer from a number of 
limitations. Criticisms have included the over-simplification of government fiscal 
behaviour with utility based on a loss function; a number of studies recording estimates 
of the models structural parameters which are inconsistent with the theoretical model; 
and that in practice the fiscal target variables used to specify the government utility 
function are unobservable meaning that they have to be estimated from past values 
(Osei, Morrissey and Lloyd, 2003; McGillivray and Morrisey, 2001; White, 1994). Perhaps 
the most important limitation of FRM’s however, is the implicit assumption that 
Government fiscal behaviour remains static. As argued in McGillivray and Morrisey 
(2001:30) in reality it would be expected for “the impact of aid on fiscal behaviour to 
change over time. Indeed, the rationale for attaching policy reform conditions to aid is to 
alter behavioural responses.”  
 
As a response to these criticisms, dynamic Vector Autoregressive (VAR) approaches 
have become an increasingly popular tool for modelling the relationship between aid and 
fiscal aggregates. This approach uses multivariate VAR models to estimate long-run (co-
integrating) relationships between a system of fiscal variables (Fagernäs and Roberts 
2004b)5.   
 
In addition, given the ‘atheoretical’ nature of VAR models this means that it is not 
necessary to estimate unknown target values required for the structural representation of 
FRMs (Osei, Morrissey and Lloyd 2003:2)6. This approach also facilitates the use of 
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) to trace the dynamic effect on the system of an 
                                                 
5 See for example Johansen (1988), Johansen and Juselius (1992).  
6 In essence, assumptions about the exogeneity of each of the explanatory variables can also be tested within the VAR using the data, 
rather than imposed a priori, and can then be applied to simulate the effect of injections of aid via impulse response analysis.  
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exogenous shock to one of the variables through deviations of the shocked time paths 
from the expected time path given by the model7,8.  
 
Although still a relatively new component of the aid effectiveness literature a number of 
country-level studies have recorded some important findings. Sugema and Chowdhury 
(2005) for example find that in Indonesia project aid allocated to development activities 
has also been used to increase what they term ‘routine’ expenditures, suggesting that aid 
has been fungible across the two activities. These authors also find that aid flows have 
tended to make the Indonesian government fiscally ‘lazy’ as the availability of aid has 
acted as a disincentive to mobilise domestic revenue through a more efficient and 
effective taxation system. 
 
Fagernäs and Roberts (2004a) study Zambia between 1964 and 20019 showing that an 
injection of foreign aid is accompanied by sustained higher levels of both recurrent and 
capital expenditure levels. Aid inflows have however also been associated with lower 
domestic revenue receipts as well as higher levels of domestic borrowing. This suggests 
that, rather than using aid funds to stabilise the economy, the government has tended to 
take the opportunity to relax fiscal and macroeconomic controls as aid has permitted 
public expenditures to rise well above levels able to be financed from domestic resources. 
 
In contrast, Osei, Morrissey, and Lloyd (2003) find that for Ghana between 1966 and 
1998 foreign aid has been associated with reduced domestic borrowing and increased tax 
effort, combining to increase public spending by more than the initial aid inflows. 
Fagernäs and Schurich (2004) also find similar results for their study of Malawi over the 
period 1970 to 2000 concluding that external finance has had a positive long-run impact 
on the Government’s development budget whilst having a negative impact on levels of 
domestic borrowing. Although in this case the aid inflow is found to have had no impact 
on the domestic tax effort.  
                                                 
7 The final advantage of the VAR approach is that it provides a highly tractable framework unlike fiscal response models which 
require significant effort in determining the structural coefficient estimations from the reduced form parameters (Franco-Rodriguez 
2000).   
8 This representation also treats aid and fiscal behavior as interdependent, where an adverse shock on the fiscal side will have follow 
up impacts on aid. For example, a fall in domestic revenue may generate the need to increase aid inflows.  In exchange, there are also 
feed back effects from aid - the availability of aid may reduce the need to adjust revenue sources or budgeted expenditures. Thus, 
rather than the uni-directional relationships posited by FRMs, aid and fiscal policy in the VAR framework interact in a dynamic 
manner.  
9 In this case the authors use a VAR rather than VECM approach as each of the fiscal aggregate variables were found to be stationary 
and hence there was no need to estimate a VECM model. Notably, in this case the impulse response analysis can only be used to 
examine the effects of a one-period increase in aid, whereas in the case of the VEC model used for Uganda and Malawi, only a 
permanent increase in the level of aid is feasible (as the model is run with differenced variables) (Fagernäs and Roberts 2004a:33). 
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 One limitation of the component of this literature assessing the impact of aid on 
‘development’ and ‘non-development’ related expenditures has been its almost 
exclusively on recurrent and development (capital) budget classifications (see Fagernäs 
and Roberts, 2004a; Fagernäs and Schurich, 2004; and Sugema and Chowdhury, 2005). 
In practice, development expenditures often involve a large portion of recurrent costs. 
Personal emoluments of teachers and doctors are a good example of this as is road 
maintenance. Likewise, development budgets are not necessarily comprised of 
expenditures which may be considered pro-poor or even pro-growth. This issue is raised 
in Feeny (2007) who argues that “donors financing items such as the wages of health and 
education workers is arguably no less developmental than the construction of schools 
and hospitals.” In addition, aid has also often led to a need for higher levels of ongoing 
recurrent expenditures, particularly in Melanesia which has received large proportions of 
foreign aid in the form of projects (Feeny 2007:448). As such this paper adopts an 
alternative method of allocating expenditure priorities, using a sectoral rather than 
functional basis. As shall be explained, ‘development’ sectors are said to include, health, 
education, infrastructure and law and order.  
 
Another limitation of both the VAR and FRM literature has been its treatment of aid as a 
homogenous good. As discussed, a key motivation for the shift in Australian financial 
assistance from budget support to project aid was a perception that untied financial 
support had been encouraging the growth of unproductive consumption expenditures 
and reduced the motivation for domestic tax collection. Scaling up the proportion of 
grants given as project based aid was thus seen by Australia, as a method of ensuring that 
allocated funds were used on pro-development activities rather than general government 
consumption. As such, another issue which this paper seeks to address is whether 
different types of aid delivery have led to different fiscal outcomes in post independence 
PNG. 
 
3. The Model  
The structural representation of the fiscal system can be derived easily from a utility 
maximising recipient government who derives benefit from allocating government funds 
across two expenditure priorities in each period t, those related to development 
activities,
,D tE , and other general government spending ,G tE  . Assuming the government’s 
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preferences can be expressed with the familiar Cobb-Douglas utility function this can be 
written as:  
1
, , , ,( , ) .D t G t D t G tU E E E E
α −
=
α                                                                                                (1) 
The budget constraint facing this recipient government is determined by its domestic 
resource collection, , and foreign grant flows which for the purposes of this paper are 
said to comprise two types, untied budget support, 
tT
tBS , or as aid earmarked for 
expenditure on particular activities or sectors of the economy through project or 
program delivery mechanisms, . Shortfalls between expenditures and revenues are 
then captured by changes in the government’s debt levels (borrowing) or alternatively the 
deficit/surplus, . As such the budget constraint can be written as:  
tPR
tD
, , , ,. . ( )D t D t G t G t t t t tP E P E T BS PR Dφ+ − + + =                                                                   (2) 
Where the φ  parameter represents the amount of aid which the recipient government 
perceives it can use to free up its own revenues to spend on other priorities, i.e. lowering 
taxation and borrowing or altering the expenditure composition between 
,D tE and ,G tE . 
The government maximisation problem can be written as:  
, , , , ,( , ) ( )
max ( , ) . . ( ) . . 0
D G
D t G t t t t t Dt D t G t G tE E G
U E E s t T BS PR D P E P Eφ
∈Γ
+ + + − + =                              (3) 
 
Which solves to give a system of interdependent fiscal equations relating foreign aid to 
expenditure levels, changes in public debt, and domestic revenue, according to: 
( , , , )
( , , , )
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( , , , ,
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D
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π
=
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=
=
=
)
)
                                                
                                            (4) 
4. Estimation Method and Issues  
VAR models can be broadly classified as a multivariate extension of Granger causality 
testing, where each of the dependant variables are a function both of lagged values of 
themselves and a number of other endogenous explanatory terms (Enders 2003).  VAR 
analysis does however require that each of the variables must be stationary (Hamilton 
1995:651)10. In the case that each variable is non-stationary, and they also satisfy the 
 
10 Non-stationary time series are defined by a stochastic process which has a mean and/or variance which changes over time causing 
the covariance structure to be time dependant (Gujarati 1995:792). 
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requirement of being integrated of the same order, typically I(1), then this analysis can be 
extended to a VECM framework. In this case, each of the variables are first differenced 
to establish stationarity and then these differenced variables are applied to the VECM 
framework via Granger’s representation theorem (Engle and Granger 1987). The linear 
combination of these variables are interpreted as long run static equilibrium relationships, 
(Johansen, 1988; and Johansen and Juselius, 1990). Each equation is then estimated with 
an error correction term which represents the speed of adjustment to out of equilibrium 
movements in any of the fiscal variables11.  
 
For the purposes of estimation, external financing of the budget deficit is taken as the 
excluded variable from the system of equations. This is to avoid the estimation of an 
identity which would render any of the VECM results meaningless (Fagernas and 
Roberts 2008:38). For this purpose, the choice was made to exclude the external loan 
financing component of the budget deficit. This choice reflects that aid flows to PNG 
have been largely dominated by foreign grants rather than loans and are likely to continue 
doing so into the future, hence the results will have more practical policy implications.  
 
The estimated coefficients of VECM do not however incorporate the full flow on effects 
of changes in each of the variables, given that they are linked both with a lag and 
contemporaneously. The coefficient of a shock to aid on government revenue for 
example will capture the direct impact but will not capture the possible affect that this aid 
shock might have if it leads to an increase in expenditure and the subsequent impact that 
higher expenditures might have in turn on revenue collection and so on.  
 
These flow on effects of changes in foreign financial assistance are captured with the use 
of IRFs (Pesaran and Shin 1998). IRFs have the advantage of showing the complete time 
profile of the effect of a shock to one variable (this study will focus on shocks to aid 
flows) both on the contemporaneous and future values of all of the other endogenous 
fiscal aggregate variables. In doing this, they capture both the direct and feedback effects 
caused by the endogeneity of the variables over time (Osei, Morrissey and Lloyd 
2003:13).  
 
                                                 
11 The larger the coefficient the greater the adjustment of the dependant variable to the deviation from a long-run equilibrium in the 
previous period (Dolado, Gonzalo, and Marmol 2001:638)11. 
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The impulse is made through the residual in the aid equation with a one standard error 
shock. Given that the VECM is estimated in first differences, a shock or impulse to aid is 
expected to have a persistent impact on the levels of other variables, as the shock itself is 
permanent in nature (Pesaran and Shin 1998). Whilst the shocks are permanent, provided 
that they meet standard stability requirements the impulse responses are eventually 
expected to converge to a level that is consistent with the estimated long-run, co-
integrating relationship estimated in the VECM12.  
 
Like FRMs the VECM procedure also has limitations. This includes the potential to 
over-parameterise the model with limited degrees of freedom given that each of the 
variables are deemed to affect each other both contemporaneously and with lags 
(Fagernas and Roberts 2004a:31). Results obtained with both VAR and VECM have also 
been shown to be sensitive to the number of lags chosen for the analysis (Stock and 
Watson 1993), although this can minimised with the application of a number of tests to 
determine appropriate lag length. Another limitation of this approach is the lack of 
confidence intervals for the IRFs. As such, the impulse responses can only be generally 
interpreted as indicative of the actual impact which may be within a range of that 
estimated (Fagernäs and Schurich 2004:24). 
5. Data Collection  
5.1 Measuring Aid  
Given that primary interest of this analysis is on the impact of aid on aggregate fiscal 
performance the decision is made to use those aid flows which appear ‘on-budget’. In 
PNG, public sector officials are typically unlikely to be aware of the amount of spending 
in off-budget aid activities and it is therefore assumed that they do not incorporate them 
into their expenditure and revenue raising decisions. In addition, a large portion of PNG 
grant aid is received by various Non-Government Organisations and other aid charities 
so would be unlikely to affect budgetary decisions. The underlying assumption of this 
paper then is that public sector agencies and officials respond to ‘on-budget’ aid flows 
rather than ‘off-budget’. 
 
This paper draws on grant aid data (disaggregated between budget support and 
project/program aid) collected from official PNG Government Budget Documents from 
                                                 
12 A limitation of the impulse response function approach is the potential under-identification of the estimated system given that all 
effects of omitted variables are thus assumed to be incorporated in the innovations. In this light, the coefficient estimates are likely to 
represent granger causality rather than pure causality (Engle and Granger 1987).  
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1974 to 2008. This 35 year data set matches or exceeds the degrees of freedom offered in 
most other papers within the literature.  
5.2 Measuring Development and Non-Development Expenditures  
This paper focuses on the classification of Government expenditure according to its 
function. This requires an extensive data collection exercise. In the first instance the IMF 
Government Financial Statistics (GFS) (2008) database was used to allocate spending to 
each of the four development expenditure categories, health, education, infrastructure 
and law and order, with all remaining spending being placed into the ‘general’ category.  
 
Secondly, to fill in a number of years of missing data, the functional allocations from 
Volume II of the PNG National Budget were also used to allocate recurrent 
expenditures into the same classification system as used in the IMF GFS database. These 
data were then added to the expenditure from the IMF dataset and classified into two 
categories, ‘development’ expenditures and ‘general’ expenditures.  
 
A difficulty of this approach is that functional allocations are not available for 
Development Budget expenditures.  As such, these expenditures were allocated from 
Departmental records available in Volume III of the Budget documents. In this case, 
development expenditures for departments involved in the delivery of each one of the 
four development categories were added to the recurrent budget allocations to generate 
total development and general expenditures. A full listing of both Recurrent and 
Development Budget allocations can be found in Appendix 1.  
5.3 Measuring Domestic Revenue and Public Debt Levels  
For consistency, domestic revenue and public debt data is also taken from PNG national 
budget documents. Domestic revenue includes all revenue derived from company tax, 
personal tax and VAT as well as import and excise duties. Public debt includes the sum 
of all domestic and foreign debt liabilities owed by the government to both private and 
concessional lending sources. Net borrowing levels are then calculated from annual 
changes in this public debt data. All variables are measured in constant 2006 Kina and 
taken as a percentage of GDP.   
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5.4 Descriptive Statistics   
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Key Variables  
Variable Description: All 
Variables 
expressed as a per 
cent of GDP 
Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
ex Total Expenditures  35 31.365 3.710 24.248 38.634 
ex_d Total Development 
expenditures  35 11.683 2.491 7.352 15.949 
ex_g Total General 
Expenditures  35 19.683 3.558 13.407 28.668 
dr Domestic Revenue  35 22.038 4.927 10.472 33.169 
gr Grant Revenue  35 7.682 3.434 2.448 14.672 
gr_bs Grant Revenue – 
Budget Support  35 5.728 5.035 0.000 14.672 
gr_pr Grant Revenue – 
Program Support  35 1.954 2.618 0.000 8.406 
pd Public Debt  35 43.784 12.715 24.779 71.771 
D.pd_d Domestic financing of 
budget deficit  35 0.284 3.089 -8.716 5.956 
 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of each of these variables along with their 
respective abbreviations. The average level of total government expenditure is 31 per 
cent of GDP. From this, approximately 12 per cent of GDP has been allocated to what 
have been termed development expenditures with the remaining 20 per cent of GDP 
being allocated to the general category. PNG’s deficit bias can be seen by comparing the 
sum of average domestic revenue and grant revenue levels with total expenditure levels, 
which leaves a difference of approximately 2 per cent of GDP.  The average level of 
public debt is 43 per cent of GDP, peaking at almost 72 per cent of GDP in 2002. Of 
this Government debt 67 per cent has been held by foreign creditors on average whilst 
the remaining 33 per cent has been held domestically. The largest decline in domestic 
debt liabilities which occurred in a single year is 8.7 per cent of GDP whilst the biggest 
increase in domestic borrowing is 6 per cent GDP. 
 
6. Estimation Results  
The first step in the analysis is to establish whether the variables are stationary or non-
stationary. For this purpose the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron 
tests are used. The two tests produce supporting results. The ADF test results are 
presented in Table 213. The results show that all the variables are found to be stationary 
at the 95 per cent significance level in their first difference form with the assumption of a 
                                                 
13 Phillips-Perron tests available upon request.  
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constant only. All variables are non-stationary and integrated of order 1, I(1). 
 
It is 
therefore appropriate to estimate models that include variables in their first differenced 
form through the VECM procedure.  
 
Table 2: Stationarity Test for Key Fiscal Variables  
Variable ADF 
Test 
Stat 
ADF 
Critical 
Value 
ADF  
p-
value 
ADF 
Test 
Stat 
after 
1st Diff
ADF 
Critical 
Value 
after 1st 
Diff 
ADF 
p-
value 
after 
1st Diff
Stationary 
ex -2.242 -2.975 0.191 -6.120 -2.978 0.000 I(1) 
ex_d -1.605 -2.975 0.481 -6.815  -2.978 0.000 I(1) 
ex_g -1.565 -2.975 0.501 -5.637 -2.978 0.000 I(1) 
dr -2.073 -2.975 0.255 -6.872 -2.978 0.000 I(1) 
gr -2.060 -2.975 0.260 -5.776 -2.978 0.000 I(1) 
gr_bs  -1.802 -2.975 0.379 -4.143 -2.978 0.001 I(1) 
gr_pr -0.896 -2.975 0.789 -7.090  -2.978 0.000 I(1) 
D.pd_d -1.543 -2.975 0.512 -4.784 -2.978 0.001 I(1) 
 
6.1 Model I – Fiscal Aggregates   
The first model incorporates the system of equations derived in Equation (4) into the 
VECM framework to analyse the impact of grant flows on domestic revenue collection, 
aggregate expenditure and levels of domestic borrowing. For the purposes of estimation, 
external financing of the budget deficit is taken as the excluded variable from the system 
of equations. This is to avoid the estimation of an identity which would render any of the 
VECM results meaningless (Fagernas and Roberts 2008:38). This approach also places 
the focus of the results on the impact of aid grants rather than donor loans. This choice 
reflects that aid flows to PNG have been largely dominated by foreign grants rather than 
loans and are likely to continue doing so into the future, hence the results will have more 
practical policy implications. Given this the following model is estimated:  
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1 1 1
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where  is domestic revenue collection at time t,  is domestic borrowing, 
 is grant revenue and 
tDR . _ tD PD d
tGR tEX  is total government expenditure. For expositional 
simplicity, equals a vector of the other three non dependent variables such that for 
the 
t iY −
tDR  equation  =D.t iY − _ t iPD d − ,  andt iGR − t iEX − , where i is the number of lags 
chosen within the model. The , 1k tψ −  term represents the cointegrating equation residuals 
so that the  terms represent each of the adjustment coefficients. The optimal lag 
lengths of the model are shown by r and n, and chosen by standard diagnostic tests. Each 
of the error terms is assumed to have the normal white noise characteristics.  
kα
 
Appropriate lag length is chosen on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
and Hannan-Quinn Information Criteria (HQIC)14 (Gujarati 2003:537). In the current 
case, both AIC and HQIC are minimised with the use of 2 lags (Table 3, Appendix 2).  
The Johansen trace statistic test is then used to determine the cointegrating rank of the 
model15. The trace test rejects the null hypothesis of no co-integrating vectors but fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of 1 co-integrating vector. That is to say, that there exists one 
linear combination of the variables (Table 4, Appendix 2). The results of the co-
integrating relationship amongst the variables within the VECM framework are 
presented in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Cointegrating Relationships for Model I 
Normalised on 
Domestic 
Borrowing 
Coefficients 
D.pd_d 1 
gr 1.715*** (0.377) 
dr 0.973*** (0.227) 
ex -1.097*** (0.241) 
Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.1; ** 
p<.05; *** p<.01. Johansen normalization 
restriction imposed on domestic borrowing. 
 
 
In accordance with the VECM procedure the cointegrating relationship is normalised, in 
this case with domestic financing of the fiscal deficit taking on a unitary value (Lutkepohl 
                                                 
14 It is also standard practice to test for evidence of residual serial correlation which will be done following the VECM estimations. 
15 This process is based on Johanson’s trace test statistic which states that if the test statistic is greater than the Johanson critical value, 
the null hypothesis that there are v cointegrating vectors is rejected in favour of the alternative that there are more than v (Johanson, 
1988; Maddala and Kim, 1998:211). 
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1991). Because the variables show a long run equilibrium identity which is equated to zero 
a positive coefficient for one of the variables estimate suggests a negative ceteris paribus long 
run relationship with the normalised domestic borrowing variable. Likewise, a negative 
coefficient estimate suggests a positive ceteris paribus long run relationship with the 
normalised domestic borrowing variable. A number of important results are found. Grant 
revenue has a highly significant positive coefficient estimate, suggesting that over the long 
term it has tended to act as a substitute for government borrowing. Similarly, higher levels 
of domestic revenue collection are also associated with reduced levels of domestic 
borrowing. Lastly, the expenditure variable is negative and also highly significant indicating 
that higher long run levels of government expenditure have been associated with higher 
levels of domestic borrowing.  
 
Table 6 presents the results of the VECM coefficients. The estimated coefficients for the 
error correction term reveal which of the variables adjust to correct imbalance in the 
fiscal situation whilst the variable coefficients show the short-run effects of changes in 
the explanatory variables on the dependant variable.  
Table 6: VECM Results for Model I 
 1/ D_pd_d 2/ D_dr 3/ D_gr 4/ D_ex 
L.D.pd_d 0.081 
(0.203) 
-0.076 
(0.150) 
0.066 
(0.078) 
-0.163 
(0.165) 
L.gr -0.285 
(0.570) 
-0.571 
(0.421) 
0.093 
(0.220) 
-1.175** 
(0.462) 
L.dr -0.130 
(0.367) 
-0.173 
(0.271) 
0.157 
(0.142) 
-0.497 
(0.299)* 
L.ex -0.144 
(0.306) 
-0.005 
(0.226) 
0.023 
(0.118) 
0.381 
(0.250) 
 
L.π 
-0.751**   
(0.317) 
-0.049 
(0.234) 
-0.105 
(0.122) 
0.438* 
(0.258) 
Normality 
Test 
(Jarque-
Bera) 
χ2 
(Prob> χ2) 
 
 
 
 
0.965  
(0.617) 
 
 
 
 
3.805 
(0.149) 
 
 
 
 
0.057 
(0.971) 
 
 
 
 
1.509 
(0.470) 
All – 
Normality  
χ2 
(Prob> χ2) 
 
 
3.937 
(0.137) 
 
Autocorrelation  
χ2 
(Prob> χ2) 
 
- Lag 1 –  
10.747 
(0.824) 
 
- Lag 2 – 
13.020      
(0.671) 
p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. All the estimations are made with an unrestricted 
constant in the model. Autocorrelation tests H0: no autocorrelation at lag 
order. As such fail to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
 
The Jarque-Bera method is used to test for normality assumptions.  This technique tests 
the null hypothesis that the data are from a normal distribution, with a rejection of the 
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null indicating that the data are not from a normal distribution (Jarque and Bera 1980)16. 
In each case, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the data are from a normal 
distribution at a 95 per cent confidence level. Similarly the tests for residual 
autocorrelation in each of the equations as well as for the entire model fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.  
 
Adjustment to fiscal imbalances have occurred primarily through changes in the 
expenditure equation, and to a lessor extent domestic financing of public debt. In both 
these cases the lagged error correction terms, L.π, are significant, whereas the domestic 
revenue and grant revenue coefficients are insignificant at a 90 per cent confidence level. 
As discussed, these variables capture the adjustment of the relevant variables towards the 
long-run equilibrium. Hence in this representation, expenditure levels and following this 
borrowing levels are the key variables which adjusts in the short term to correct 
imbalances in the budget according to Equation (6). As shall be discussed, this is an 
intuitive result with expenditure being one of the most flexible and easily adjustable fiscal 
instruments at the governments disposal. The lagged grant revenue variable is also 
significant but negatively signed. This suggests that in the short term at least grant 
revenues have tended to replace rather than augment domestic expenditure levels.  
 
Whilst the VECM results estimate the direct impacts between each of these variables in 
practice there are likely to be important flow on effects occurring within the budgetary 
cycle. The total long term impact of an increase in grants is now assessed with the use of 
the IRF analysis discussed. This approach captures both the direct and indirect effects as 
well as those attributed to the error correction mechanism.  
                                                 
16 This null hypothesis is a joint hypothesis of the skewness being zero and the excess kurtosis being zero, since samples from a 
normal distribution have an expected skewness of 0 and an expected excess kurtosis of 0 (which is the same as a kurtosis of 3). As the 
definition of JB shows, any deviation from this increases the JB statistic (Jarque and Bera 1980). 
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Chart 1: Model I IRF– Domestic Borrowing, Expenditure and Domestic Revenue  
-1
.5
-1
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irf of gr -> D_pd_d
irf of gr -> ex
irf of gr -> dr
 
Source: Authors Calculations 
 
Chart 1 illustrates the impact of an increase in grants on domestic borrowing, 
expenditure and domestic revenue collection. Here the one standard deviation shock to 
grants leads in the first instance to a unanimous decline in all three of the response 
variables. Following this the effect of the grant impulse continues to have a sustained 
negative impact on levels of domestic revenue. This suggests that grant aid has acted as a 
substitute for domestic revenue collection, with a one standard deviation impulse to aid 
leading to an approximately half sized fall in taxation receipts after 5 years. The negative 
impact of grants on spending is short lived, with the effect eventually stabilising after 
approximately five years at a near zero value, after a short positive period. The 
concurrent negative impact of aid on domestic borrowing however suggests that a large 
portion of the grant impulse is also allocated towards lowering the public debt burden. In 
this sense, once all of the knock on effects within the fiscal system have stabilised the 
shock to grants acts primarily to replace domestic revenue collection and lower public 
debt levels, rather than augment levels of government expenditure. 
 
Each of these long term relationships are also presented in the cumulative impulse 
response functions shown in Chart 2, Appendix 3 which give the cumulative sum of all 
of the response values to the given grant aid shock from all previous periods. These 
results further show the weak impact of aid on total spending and its negative 
relationship with domestic revenue and domestic borrowing. In terms of domestic 
revenue this supports the earlier contention that foreign aid may have acted as a 
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significant disincentive for the PNG government to expand its own domestic revenue 
sources. Another explanation for these results may also be due to some indirect 
‘conditionality’ effects of aid. Aid grants to PNG have been routinely made conditional 
on the implementation of public sector reform and reduced public spending as a means 
of controlling public debt. Some of the most notable examples of this were the major 
donor interventions following the 1991, 1994 and 1999 financial crises, which all 
imposed expenditure reduction targets in the immediate post crisis periods.17  
 
6.2 Model II – Fiscal Aggregates and Expenditure Composition  
The second model now considers the impact of grant revenues and domestic revenues 
on the composition of fiscal expenditures between the development and general 
expenditure categories. As such, the model estimates the following relationships:  
          
10 , 1 1 2 _1 1 1
20 , 1 3 4 _1 1 1
30 , 1 5 61 1 1
40 ,1
_ _
_ _
r n n
t k k t i t-i i t-i EX Dtk i i
r n n
t k k t i t-i i t-i EX Gtk i i
r n n
t k k t i t-i i t-i GRtk i i
r
t k k tk
EX D c EX D Y
EX G c EX O Y
GR c GR Y
DR c
α ψ α α ε
α ψ α α ε
α ψ α α ε
α ψ
−
=
= =
−
=
= =
−
=
= =
=
Δ = + Σ + Δ + Δ +∑ ∑
Δ = + Σ + Δ + Δ +∑ ∑
Δ = + Σ + Δ + Δ +∑ ∑
Δ = + Σ 1 7 8
1 1
50 , 1 9 10 . _1 1 1
. _ . _
n n
i t-i i t-i DRti i
r n n
t k k t i t-i i t-i D PD dtk i i
DR Y
D PD d c D PD d Y
α α ε
α ψ α α ε
−
= =
−
=
= =
+ Δ + Δ +∑ ∑
Δ = + Σ + Δ + Δ +∑ ∑
                    (7) 
 
where _ tEX D is the development expenditures category, _ tEX G is the general 
expenditure category,  is domestic revenue collection,  is grant revenue and 
is domestic borrowing. Again,  simply equals the vector of the other four 
non dependent variables and 
tDR tGR
. _ tD PD d t iY −
, 1k tψ −  represents the cointegrating equation residuals so that 
the  terms represent the adjustment coefficients. As usual, each of the error terms is 
assumed to have the normal white noise characteristics.  
kα
 
The AIC and HQIC again suggest that the model should again be estimated with two 
lags (Table 7, Appendix 2), whilst the Johanson procedure rejects the null hypothesis of 
no co-integrating vectors but fails to reject the null hypothesis of one co-integrating 
                                                 
17 Another explanation for this result is that that the provision of donor grants, say in the form of technical 
assistance, may have contributed to reforms which lowered or removed many trade tariffs, hence lowering 
overall revenue collection. 
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vector (Table 8, Appendix 2).  The co-integrating relationships amongst the variables 
after again being normalised on domestic borrowing within the VECM framework are 
defined in Table 9.  
Table 9: Cointegrating Relationships for Model II 
Normalised on 
Domestic 
Borrowing 
Coefficients 
D.pd_d 1 
gr 1.310*** 
(0.335) 
dr 0.609 
(0.206)*** 
ex_d -1.107*** 
(0.244) 
ex_g -0.508* 
(0.270) 
Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.1; ** p<.05; 
*** p<.01. Johansen normalization restriction 
imposed on domestic borrowing.  
 
The results support those obtained for the cointegrating relationships in Model I. Both 
grant and domestic revenues have a highly significant negative association with long run 
levels of domestic borrowing, whilst both of the expenditure variables have a highly 
significant positive impact on long run levels of domestic borrowing. In short, over the 
long term more fiscal resources have led to lower levels of domestic debt accumulation 
whilst higher levels of spending have had a positive relationship with domestic 
borrowing.  
 
The short-run VECM coefficients are now presented in Table 10. The results again show 
that expenditure levels have been a key adjustment mechanism to imbalances in the fiscal 
system. Of the two expenditure categories however, those related to development 
activities have been the major source of these adjustments.  
Table 10: VECM Results for Model II  
 1/  
D_gr 
2/ 
 D2_pd_d      
3/ 
 D2_dr 
4/ 
D_ex_d 
5/ 
D_ex_g 
L.D.pd_d 0.053 (0.078) 
0.046 
(0.199) 
-0.135 
(0.152) 
-0.009 
(0.088) 
-0.188 
(0.133) 
L.gr 0.223 (0.235) 
0.023 
(0.601) 
-0.539 
(0.459) 
-0.220 
(0.267) 
-0.658* 
(0.400) 
L.dr 0.162 (0.145) 
-0.064 
(0.372) 
-0.269 
(0.284) 
0.027 
(0.165) 
0.614 
(0.248)** 
L.ex_g 0.112 (0.131) 
0.130 
(0.336) 
0.125 
(0.257) 
0.073 
(0.149) 
0.452** 
(0.224) 
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L.ex_d -0.192 (0.204) 
-0.690 
(0.523) 
-0.187 
(0.399) 
-0.119 
(0.232) 
0.014 
(0.349) 
L.π 0.0358 (0.040) 
0.251** 
(0.103) 
-0.046 
(0.079) 
-0.059 
(0.046) 
0.099 
(0.069) 
Normality Test 
(Jarque-Bera) 
χ2 
(Prob> χ2) 
 
 
1.712 
(0.424) 
 
 
0.167 
(0.920) 
 
 
2.133 
(0.344) 
 
 
2.004 
(0.367) 
 
 
2.897 
(0.234) 
All – Normality  
χ2 
(Prob> χ2) 
 
8.913 
(0.540) 
Autocorrelation 
χ2 
(Prob> χ2) 
- Lag 1 – 
28.882 
(0.268) 
- Lag 2 – 
25.746 
(0.421) 
 
p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. All the estimations are made with an unrestricted constant in the 
model. Autocorrelation tests H0: no autocorrelation at lag order. As such fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation.  
 
As in the previous model, the adjustment parameter in the domestic borrowing equation 
is again significant and positively signed. This suggests that the PNG Government has 
tended to favour varying levels of public borrowing in order to adjust to short term fiscal 
imbalances. The implication here is that government has found it easier, or has been 
more willing, to incur variations in levels of domestic debt than it has for each of the 
other fiscal aggregates. This may have occurred for example by absorbing shortfalls in 
domestic revenue collection by increasing the deficit rather than reigning in expenditure 
levels.  
 
These results support observations surrounding the PNG government’s reluctance to 
reign in expenditures even during period with substantially lower revenue. An example of 
this was in the early 1990’s when the closure of the Bougainville mining operations left a 
large hole in domestic revenue collection. Rather than cutting expenditures during this 
period to adjust to the fiscal imbalance, development expenditures remained relatively 
constant and the general expenditure category actually increased. Given relatively 
constant grant revenue sources this period thus also saw a surge in public debt levels – 
illustrating a broader PNG Government tendency to use public debt as ‘shock absorbers’ 
to imbalances in the fiscal situation.  
 
Each of the long term relationships between the fiscal and aid variables are now again 
shown with the use of generalised and cumulative impulse response functions which 
illustrate the full knock on effects of an aid impulse. Chart 3 shows the impact of a one 
standard deviation shock to grant revenue on domestic revenue, public debt and both of 
the expenditure categories, whilst Chart 4, Appendix 3 illustrates the cumulative version 
of the IRF. .  
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Chart 3: Model II IRF – Domestic Revenue, Domestic Borrowing and Government 
Expenditures  
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Source: Authors Calculations 
 
The results for domestic borrowing and domestic revenue are comparatively similar to 
those established within Model I. A one standard deviation shock to grant aid leads to a 
decline both in levels of domestic borrowing and in domestic revenue mobilisation. 
Again, this suggests that while a portion of aid is treated as a substitute for further 
government borrowing that it has also encouraged the PNG Government to place a 
lower tax burden on its domestic constituents.  
 
Both the general and development expenditure variables also follow a similar time path 
to that shown for total expenditures in Model I with an initial small decline followed by 
an eventually stabilisation at approximately zero. In this case however, both the variables 
are slightly positive although this effect is too small to be deemed significant in the 
absence of reliable confidence intervals.  
 
Also of note is the larger initial decrease in the general expenditure category than the 
development expenditure category, suggesting that in the short term at least the 
provision of foreign grants helps to improve the composition of PNG Government 
expenditures towards key development items. The cumulative impulse response 
functions shown in Chart 4, Appendix 2 illustrates however that this impact is eroded 
over time with a return to the original expenditure composition after approximately 7 
years.  
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 One of the most plausible explanations for these results is that initially, aid is effective at 
improving the composition of government expenditures towards key development 
sectors. Conditionality and incentive effects help to constrain general expenditures whilst 
a large portion or project and program aid sticks to the development category. Then, 
over time, the recipient bureaucracy incorporates these additional financial flows into its 
budgetary decision-making process. Following this, a reallocation of domestic funds 
occurs which leads to an expenditure composition comparable to what existed prior to 
the aid inflow. In essence, donor attempts to improve the composition of PNG 
expenditures are successful in the short but not the long term.  
6.3 Model III – Fiscal Aggregates, Expenditure Composition and Aid Modalities  
The third model now separates the grant aid variable into two components—budgetary 
support and project or program aid to determine whether these components have had 
differential impacts on the contribution of grant aid to each of these fiscal relationships. 
The final model estimates a six endogenous variable system consisting of the following 
relationships:  
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20 , 1 3 4 _1 1 1
30 , 1 5 61 1 1
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_ _
_ _
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r
t kk
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                 (8) 
 
where _ tEX D is the development expenditures category, _ tEX G is the general 
expenditures category,  is domestic revenue collection,  is domestic 
borrowing, is grant revenue given in the form of budget support and 
is grant revenue given in the form of project and program aid. All other 
variables are as defined previously.  
tDR . _ tD PD d
_ tGR BS
_ tGR PR
 
The HQIC criteria suggests that the model should be estimated with only a one year lag 
structure, whilst the AIC suggests that it should be estimated with a three year lag (Table 
11, Appendix 2).  The decision is made to use the one year lag structure both to preserve 
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degrees of freedom within what is potentially an over-paramatised model, given the 
limited degrees of freedom available and the six explanatory variables. This decision was 
also made on the basis that the one lag model produces a trace test statistic supporting 
one cointegrating relationship amongst the variables (Table 12, Appendix 2), whilst the 
three lag model suggests that there are three18. Nevertheless, without any base results to 
compare them to, the impacts of budget support vis-à-vis project and program aid on 
each of these fiscal variables should still be taken as preliminary rather than conclusive.  
                                                 
18 This provides some evidence that the three lag model adds to the problems of inconsistency in results 
when VECM models suffer from over-paramatisation.  
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Table 13: Cointegrating Relationships for Model III  
1/Normalised on 
Domestic Borrowing 
Coefficients 
D.pd_d 1 
gr_bs 2.546*** 
(0.843) 
gr_pr -1.353 
(1.009) 
dr 1.902*** 
(0.560) 
ex_d -3.364*** 
(0.811) 
ex_g -0.515 
(0.606) 
Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** 
p<.01. Johansen normalization restriction imposed.  
 
The cointegrating relationship is again normalised on domestic borrowing. In this case, 
disaggregating the grant aid variable suggests the budget support component has been 
the major contributor to reduced levels of domestic borrowing, with the project aid 
variable recording an insignificant long run cointegrating coefficient. Both expenditure 
categories also again both have negative coefficient estimates, supporting the results of 
the previous two models that higher levels of spending have a positive relationship with 
domestic borrowing. Also in line with the previous two models, higher levels of domestic 
revenue have a negative relationship with domestic borrowing. This indicates that 
increases in domestic resources are not entirely allocated to higher levels of expenditures, 
but rather to also lower domestic borrowing. Table 14 presents the VECM coefficients 
to analyse the short run dynamics of the model.  
Table 14: VECM Results for Model III  
 1/D_dr 2/D_gr_bs 3/D_gr_pr 4/ D2_pd_d     5/D_ex_d 6/D_ex_g 
L._ce1 -0.012 (0.047) 
-0.027** 
(0.013) 
0.044** 
(0.020) 
-0.097 
(0.067) 
0.067*** 
(0.025) 
 
-0.066 
(0.043) 
Normality 
Test 
(Jarque-
Bera) 
Chi-2 
(Prob>Chi2) 
 
 
 
 
0.692 
(0.707) 
 
 
 
 
2.825 
(0.243) 
 
 
 
 
1.191 
(0.551) 
 
 
 
 
1.250 
(0.535) 
 
 
 
 
0.677 
(0.712) 
 
 
 
 
0.117 
(0.943) 
All – 
Normality 
Chi-2 
(Prob>Chi2) 
 
 
6.753 
(0.873)    
Autocorrelation 
Chi-2 
(Prob>Chi-2) 
 
-  Lag 1 – 
34.343 
(0.547) 
 
 
- Lag 2 – 
  37.930 
(0.381)  
  
*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Autocorrelation tests H0: no autocorrelation at chosen lag order. As such fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.  
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Given the model is estimated with only one lag only the error correction terms are 
presented. These coefficients once more reveal that expenditures have been a key 
adjustment mechanism within this system of fiscal equations. It also appears that the 
majority of this expenditure adjustment has occurred through the development 
expenditure variable with it recording a highly significant positive coefficient estimate 
whilst the general expenditure variable is insignificant. In addition, with the 
disaggregation of aid flows the estimation results show that both project aid and budget 
support have responded to short term imbalances in PNG’s fiscal position. For instance, 
this may occur when shortfalls in domestic revenue and looming public debt crisis are 
met with large injections of additional donor assistance. Chart 5 now shows the impact 
of a one standard deviation shock to budget support on each of the fiscal variables.   
Chart 5: Model III IRF – Impact of Budget Support on Domestic Revenue, 
Domestic Borrowing and Government Expenditures 
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
0 5 10 15
Year
irf of gr_bs -> D_pd_d
irf of gr_bs -> ex_g
irf of gr_bs -> ex_d
irf of gr_bs -> dr
 
Source: Authors Calculations 
 
As in the previous two models, the shock to foreign grants (in this case in the form of 
budget support) has an unambiguous negative relationship with levels of domestic 
borrowing. In this case however, rather than eroding tax collection budget support is 
shown to have an almost benign impact on levels of domestic revenue. Budget support 
also has a significant impact on improving the composition of government spending by 
increasing the amount of funds going to key development sectors whilst reducing the 
amount of spending in the general expenditure category. This will be discussed in more 
detail shortly. 
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 Chart 6 shows the impact of a one standard deviation shock to grant revenues in the 
form of project and program aid on each of the fiscal variables. In contrast to budget 
support, project aid has encouraged higher levels of spending in the general but not 
development expenditure category.  In fact, the aid impulse has an almost insignificant 
impact on the amount of government funds allocated to key development activities. Also 
in contrast to budgetary support, the project aid impulse raises levels of domestic 
borrowing, with the effect stabilising after approximately seven years, with a close to zero 
long run impact on domestic revenue collection.   
 
Chart 6: Model III IRF – Impact of Project and Program Aid on Domestic 
Revenue, Domestic Borrowing and Government Expenditures 
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Source: Authors Calculations 
 
One explanation for this is that project aid has encouraged the PNG Government to 
undertake more than proportional resource allocations away from donor financed 
development sectors and towards general government consumption expenditure. This 
effect may be akin to what McGillivray and Morrissey (2000) refer to as ‘aid illusion’. 
This is the situation within which with imperfect information flows and weak 
expenditure management systems aid inflows can be accompanied with misperceptions 
or ‘illusions’ regarding either the real or nominal value of the aid inflow, and the 
spending conditions attached (McGillivray and Morrissey 2000:3). In the case of PNG 
for example, imperfect budgetary processes may overvalue the contribution of aid to a 
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specific project. In addition, the presence of increased donor activity within a sector too 
may also encourage the PNG Government to believe it can concentrate more of its own 
resources elsewhere.  Higher levels of expenditure for general consumption activities may 
then subsequently drive the need to increase the Government’s recourse to domestic 
borrowing to fund its deficit financing. 
 
 
Another explanation for this effect is that the large increase in project and program aid 
during the 1990s coincided with the deteriorating fiscal discipline of government and a 
rapid build up in public debt. Furthermore, two of the most significant peak increases in 
project and program aid, which occurred following the Bougainville crisis in 1989-90, 
and the final phasing out of budget support in 2001, also coincide with periods of rapidly 
increasing public debt.  
6. Conclusion  
This paper has sought to assess the impact of foreign grant aid on the fiscal behaviour of 
the PNG Government since independence. The study has been motivated by a need to 
increase donor understanding of how foreign financial assistance interacts with public 
sector behaviour to influence aggregate fiscal outcomes. Understanding the complex web 
of interactions between foreign aid and the management of fiscal aggregates can thus 
serve as a key tool in enhancing the effectiveness of foreign assistance which PNG 
receives.  
 
The analysis drew upon the VECM approach to estimate these relationships which was 
found to be appropriate with the use of Granger’s representation theorem and the non 
stationary nature of the data. This approach has also offered a number of advantages 
over traditional FRMs which have had difficulties in determining appropriate target 
variables and which are limited in their ability to consider long run dynamics. This is the 
first study to apply these methods to PNG with an extensive data collection exercise, 
allowing for an analysis of the relationships between grant aid, domestic borrowing, 
domestic revenue and development expenditure allocations. This is also the first such 
study to use this approach to consider the potentially divergent impact of budget support 
grants vis-à-vis project aid grants on the fiscal behaviour of government. In doing this, a 
number of important results are found.  
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Firstly, there is consistent evidence that expenditure and domestic borrowing have acted 
as key shock absorbers within the PNG fiscal system, whereas domestic revenue 
collection and grant aid have tended to be independent of the prevailing fiscal situation. 
In particular, the PNG Government appears to have been most willing to adjust levels of 
expenditure in a number of key development sectors in response to fiscal imbalances. 
This suggests for example that during periods of expenditure contraction, the PNG 
Government has tended to give less priority to what has been termed development 
related expenditure, whilst maintaining those classified in the general category.  
 
Secondly, aid has had an unambiguous negative effect on the accumulation of additional 
domestic debt. A positive shock to grant aid lowers domestic borrowing in both the 
short and long term. This suggests that foreign grants have acted as an important 
substitute to government borrowing across the post independence period.   
 
Grant aid has however also been associated with lower long term levels of domestic 
revenue mobilisation. As a result of this Government preference for using aid grants to 
substitute for borrowing and to replace domestic revenue collection, the net effect of aid 
grants on aggregate expenditure levels was close to zero. To an extent, this result 
supports the contention of the many critics of aid to PNG who have argued that aid has 
undermined the government’s incentive to tax domestic constituents.  
 
Preliminary evidence was also presented to suggest that these effects have varied 
considerably across different types of grant aid delivery. Budget support in particular has 
a strong relationship with the lower domestic revenue and lower domestic borrowing 
effects, although it also supports higher rates of expenditure in the development 
expenditures category. In addition to the grant inflow, this was financed from budget 
support’s impact on lowering the proportion of funds being allocated to general 
government spending items. Project aid on the other hand has a strong positive 
relationship with higher rates of general government expenditure which also corresponds 
with a positive impact on domestic borrowing and revenue levels, although both of these 
are comparatively small.  
 
These results add further insights into a number of the contentions discussed at the 
beginning of this paper. The accusation that grant aid, and in particular budget support, 
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has undermined the PNG Government’s incentive to expand its own tax collection 
appears well founded. Higher levels of grants are strongly associated with lower levels of 
domestic revenue mobilisation, reflecting a preference by the PNG Government to 
continue drawing on foreign resources rather than tax its own constituents. The claim 
that grants have supported higher overall levels of unproductive government expenditure 
are however, not supported by the data.  The PNG Government has displayed a clear 
preference for using additional grant resources to lower its levels of domestic borrowing 
rather than funding new expenditure items.  
 
There are some caveats worth noting about the reliability and usefulness of these results. 
As discussed, the VECM approach has a number of limitations including the potential to 
over parameterise the model which can lead to sensitive results in terms of lag length. 
This is particularly the case for Model III, which included six endogenous variables each 
interacting contemporaneously and with one lag for a 35-year sample. This level of 
disaggregation in both the expenditure and aid variables may place an excessive burden 
on the explanatory power of the data. It is for this reason that these results are referred 
to as preliminary. Nevertheless, the consistency of the results across all three 
specifications adds a degree of confidence to the core findings. 
 
The results reveal that there is much scope for foreign financial resources to be managed 
more effectively by both donors and the PNG Government. PNG’s continued narrow 
tax base adds significance to the tendency of grant aid to lower the government’s 
domestic revenue collection efforts—potentially highlighting that priority should be 
placed on supporting taxation collection in addition to the current focus on improving 
the quality and composition of expenditure. The preference for using grant inflows to 
lower domestic borrowing requirements rather than spending also highlights the impact 
of aid on increasing aggregate availability of resources depends first and foremost on the 
behaviour of the PNG Government, not on the priorities of donors.   
 
Delivering aid which increases, rather than replaces, the availability of resources in key 
development sectors is also a key area of concern. Australia’s renewed focus on 
supporting an expansion of basic service delivery necessitates a renewed need to engage 
in a productive dialogue with the PNG Government surrounding their development 
objectives and where donor funds can be used to support these targets. In the absence of 
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real cooperation foreign aid is likely to continue having a limited impact on financing 
development outcomes in PNG. 
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Appendix 1: Data Collection and Classification  
 
Expenditure allocations between 1974 and 2002 were made in accordance with the IMF 
Government Financial Statistics Database (IMF GFS 2008). In this case, expenditures 
were classified into 5 categories. These included health, education, law and order, 
infrastructure and other. The classifications used from the IMF database to allocate these 
expenditures are shown below.  
 
Table 13: Categorisation of IMF GFS Data into Expenditure Categories 
Category IMF GFS Code (Table 7) 
1. Health 11. Health  
2. Education 13. Education   
3. Law and Order 4. Public order and safety  
4. Infrastructure  6. Agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
hunting 
7. Fuel and energy 
 8. Mining, manufacturing and 
construction 
9. Transport 
5. General 8. Recreation, culture, and religion 6. Housing and community 
amenities 
 2a. Public Debt Transactions  10. Social Welfare and 
Protection 
 3. Defence 11. Other Non-Allocated 
Expenditures 
 5e. Other Economic Affairs and 
Services 
2b. General public services 
(less Public debt 
transactions) 
 
The most recent 2008 version of the IMF database only covers up to 2002. As a result 
another data collection effort was undertaken decomposing recent government 
expenditures into each of the 5 classifications listed above. This involved allocating 
expenditures from both the Recurrent and Development budgets.  
 
Recurrent expenditures were allocated according to Volume II, Part 1, Table 2 of the 
Budget which calculates recurrent expenditures on a functional basis. These expenditures 
were first allocated according to the IMF categories and then allocated into each of the 5 
expenditure categories as shown in Table 13. Table 14 shows the allocation rules used for 
the transfer from Budget to IMF classifications.  
 
Table 14: Allocation of Recurrent Budget Expenditures to IMF Classifications  
IMF Classification Budget Volume II, Part 1, Table 2 
Classification Code 
General public services 11, 13, 14, 15, 19, 41, 51, 52, 53  
Public debt transactions  51, 52, 53  
General public services (less Public 
debt transactions) 
11, 13, 14, 15, 19, 41 
Defence 18 
Public order and safety 17 
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Economic affairs 12, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting  31 
Fuel and energy 33 
Mining, manufacturing, and construction  35 
Transport and Communications 36 
Other Economic Affairs  12, 32, 34, 39 
Housing and community amenities 24, 25  
Health 22 
Recreation, culture, and religion  27, 28 
Education 16, 21 
Social protection 23 
Other expenditure  42 
 
Development Budget expenditures are not calculated on a functional basis. As such this 
component of the Budget was allocated to each of the 5 categories through 
Departmental allocations from both the National Department and Statutory authority 
Tables from Volume II, Part 1, Section III of the Budget Documents. The following 
allocation rules were used.  
 
Table 15: Allocation of Development Budget Expenditures  
Category  National Department (N) or Statutory Authority (S) 
1. Health 240: Dept of Health (N) 
 241: Hospital Management Services (N) 
 519: National AIDS Secretariat (S) 
 520: Institute of Medical Research (S) 
2. Education 235: Dept of Education (N) 
 236: Commission for Higher Education (N) 
 512: Uni PNG (S) 
 513: Uni Tech (S) 
 514: Uni Goroka (S) 
 515: Uni Vudal (S) 
3. Law and Order 226: Dept of Corrective and Institutional Services (N) 
 228: Dept of Police (N) 
 223: Judiciary Services (N) 
4. Infrastructure 258: Dept of Information and Communication (N) 
 259: Dept of Transport (N) 
 264: Dept of Works and Implementation (N) 
 540: Water and Sewerage Board (S) 
 567: National Road Authority (S)  
5. General All Remaining National Department and Statutory 
Authority Development Budget Expenditures  
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Appendix 2: Tables  
Table 3: Selection Order Criteria for Model I 
Selection Order Criteria  
lag AIC HQIC 
0 18.469 18.770 
1 18.108 18.651 
2 17.580* 18.606* 
3 18.252 19.036 
Table 4: Cointegration Tests for Model I 
Maximum 
Rank I 
H0: Number of Co-
integrating Vectors 
(v) 
Trace 
Statistic 
95% Critical 
Value 
Eigenvalue 
0 None  46.547* 47.21 . 
1 At most 1 21.928 29.68 0.536 
2 At most 2 10.168 15.41 0.307 
*denotes rejection of the null hypothesis that there are r co-integrating vectors at 5 
per cent significance level.  
 
Table 7: Selection Order Criteria for Model II 
Lag AIC HQIC 
0 24.159    24.3926 
1 21.660  21.785   
2 17.595* 18.219* 
3 17.947 19.076 
Table 8: Cointegration Tests for Model II 
Maximum 
Rank 
H0: Number of Co-
integrating Vectors 
(v) 
Trace 
Statistic 
95% Critical 
Value 
0 None  64.998*   68.52 
1 At most 1  39.132   47.21 
2 At most 2 20.828 29.68 
3 At most 3 6.673 15.41 
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at a 95 per cent confidence level.  
Table 11: Selection Order Criteria for Model III 
lag AIC HQIC 
0 27.917 28.197  
1 21.745 23.707* 
2 21.190 24.833 
3 19.489* 24.814 
Table 12: Cointegration Tests for Model III 
Maximum 
Rank 
Number of 
Cointegrating Vectors 
(v) 
Trace 
Statistic 
95 % Critical 
Value 
0 None  77.580*   94.15 
1 At most 1  49.746    68.52 
2 At most 2 29.269   47.21 
3 At most 3 16.7014    29.68 
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at a 95 per cent confidence level.  
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Appendix 3: Charts  
 
Chart 2: Model I Cumulative IRF – Domestic Borrowing, Domestic Revenue and 
Expenditure Levels  
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Source: Authors Calculations 
 
 
Chart 4: Model II Cumulative IRF – Domestic Borrowing, Domestic Revenue 
and Expenditure Composition 
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Source: Authors Calculations 
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